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INDUSTRIAL POLICY REARS ITS UGLY HEAD 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
HIGHLIGHTS 
o "The willingness of government to bail out a Lockheed or Chrysler is 
not surprising. That is the price that Congress is willing to pay to 
avoid dealing with the underlying industrial problems that arise from 
the existing pattern of governmental intervention in the private 
economy." {p. 3} 
0 
"Some would attempt to stop economic change by dealing with the 
so-called 'runaway plant problem' •••• This 'King Canute approach' 
ignores the reasons why companies are forced to take such actions in 
the first place. So frequently those plants have lost their 
competitiveness due in large part to the government policies advocated 
by the same groups that now support legislation against runaway 
plants." 
o "There is a growth strategy that involves no expansion in either 
government power or federal spending. Its elements are basic -- tax 
simplification, regulatory relief, lower deficit financing, and 
curtailed government lending ... {p. 5) 
o "The worst thing that we could do ••• is to shift from the much 
maligned, ad hoc approach to a tidier and better planned system of 
business bailouts. Say's Law -- supply creates its own demand -- would 
work with a vengeance. The assured supply of assistance would create 
more demands for aid." (p. 6} 
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As predictable as Spring crocuses, the high level of unemployment has led 
to pleas for an 11industrial policy 11 to restore the health of the American 
economy. By guiding investment into growth areas and out of declining 
markets, a new federal industrial policy supposedly will restore the 
competitiveness of American business at home and abroad. But, as I tell my 
students regularly, you often have to preserve the private enterprise system 
from the contrary actions of individual entrepreneurs. 
What is especially disconcerting is the number of business executives who 
are joining in this chorus for more governmental intervention. These are men 
and women who normally champion private enterprise and oppose a bigger role 
for Uncle Sam in business decision-making. 
Shortcomings of Existing Industrial Policy 
To begin with, it is important to realize that we already have many 
government policies which affect industry in important ways -- and which have 
in large measure contributed to the difficulties now being faced by the 
American economy. In the main, of course, these impacts are side-effects of 
laws designed for other purposes. There are many examples -- policies to 
provide a more equitable tax structure, to reduce the inequality of the 
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distribution of income, to enhance the quality of life, to improve the 
physical environment, and so forth. 
Most of these policies ignore or at least take for granted the needs and 
operations of the private enterprise system by focusing on non-economic and 
social goals. Intentionally or not, the result of these policies, in the 
main, has tended to be in one direction --to weaken the basic condition of 
the manufacturing sector of the economy. 
This influence on the fundamental structure of American industry, as a 
result of government policy, can readily be seen in the larger manufacturing 
companies as they shift increasing portions of their work force away from the 
creative and productive areas of business such as research and development, 
manufacturing, and marketing. This shift has resulted in an increase in the 
overhead functions -- legal activities, accounting and finance, public 
affairs, and government relations. For the individual firm, this change may 
be an essential way of responding to pressures from government agencies and 
self-styled public interest groups with noneconomic orientations. But the 
impact on national productivity can only be negative. 
Moreover, this change is compounded by the metamorphosis of the 
traditional functions, such as the growing size of 11defensive" research as a 
major mission of industrial laboratories. That refers to reorienting business 
research efforts to please the regulators. Similarly, 11 reverse distribution .. 
has become a new marketing function. That refers to gearing for and, on 
occasion, carrying out product recalls. The ultimate effects of these 
responses to government dictates go far beyond the immediate compliance 
expenses. Often, they contribute to the problems which spur the current calls 
for reindustrialization. 
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By overlooking these structural responses to existing governmental 
policy, all that is visible in the short run are the pleas for bailouts, 
subsidies, and other special assistance from the companies that are most 
severely affected by the governmental burdens imposed on American industry. 
But, on reflection, the willingness of government to bail out a Lockheed or a 
Chrysler is not surprising. That is the price that Congress is willing to pay 
to avoid dealing with the underlying industrial problems that arise from the 
existing pattern of governmental intervention in the private economy. 
Why Bring Back the RFC? 
A focal point for the current advocates of industrial policy is the 
proposed reestablishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Let us 
take a detailed look at that idea. As we may recall, that federal agency was 
a creature of the Depression of the 1930s which grew rapidly during and 
following World War II. Those with short memories may think well of that 
government enterprise . But a review of its activities is instructive for 
today•s situation. 
Under the original act passed in 1932, Congress granted the RFC very 
modest lending powers limited to railroads and financial institutions. During 
the next six years, however, the agency•s authority was steadily broadened. 
By 1938, it had the power to buy the securities of any business enterprise. 
The RFC had become an extensive corporate bail-out agency in the form of a 
government-sponsored investment bank. Attention is usually focused on the 
contributions that the RFC made during the Depression and World War II. 
Nevertheless, most of its loans to business were made in the postwar boom 
period of the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
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The statutory criteria for loan approvals were extremely vague. As we 
would expect, Congress stipulated that the RFC should extend loans only for 
purposes that would serve the public interest. By 1949, rumors circulated 
that connections with influential people in Washington were often the real 
basis for gaining loan approvals from the RFC. Subsequently, Congressional 
hearings disclosed numerous examples of favoritism and corruption in the 
granting of RFC loans. Finally, in 1953, Congress ended the life of what was 
by then a discredited agency. 
There is indeed much to learn from the operations of the RFC. 
Its history shows that government subsidy of business encourages and 
perpetuates a misallocation of resources. The agency•s loans included such 
11 high priority .. ventures as distillers, brewers, drive-in theaters, hotels, 
motels, and bars. The RFC experience also demonstrates once again that 
government programs develop a life of their own and persist long after the 
problems for which they were created have been solved. 
Variations on the negative theme of focusing on the 11 losers 11 are not 
limited to the notion of bringing back the RFC. Some would attempt to stop 
economic change by dealing with the so-called 11 runaway plant problem ... Their 
response is to make it extremely difficult and costly to move or close down an 
industrial facility. This 11 King Canute approach 11 ignores the reasons why 
companies are forced to take such actions in the first place. So frequently 
those plants have lost their competitiveness due in large part to the 
government policies advocated by the same groups that now support legislation 
against runaway plants. Such proposals also overlook the negative signals 
that this policy would send out to any company considering building a new 
plant in a region that has adopted restrictive legislation (and a few states 
already have done so). 
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Close cousins of this negative approach are proposals to 11 protect 11 
various industries and markets from foreign competition and to inhibit 
American investments overseas. None of these approaches would lead to a more 
productive or more competitive economy. They often would shelter companies 
and localities from their own mistakes. 
A Positive Approach 
All this, however, need not lead to a 11 do nothing 11 approach to the 
serious economic questions that face the United States. There is a growth 
strategy that involves no expansion in either government power or federal 
spending. Its elements are basic --tax simplification, regulatory relief, 
lower deficit financing, and curtailed government lending. In each of these 
areas, much needs to and can be done. 
The 1981 tax reductions were surely welcome. But the sad fact of the 
matter is that the tax code is far more complicated today than it was just a 
few years ago. To any one who has ever tried to fill out the tax forms for a 
small company, it is clear that simplification is not just a pleasant thought, 
but a vitally important need. 
Similarly, the regulatory relief effort has accomplished much in reducing 
the burden of new rules. But fundamental improvement can come only from 
revising existing statutes that mandate unreasonable burdens of compliance, 
such as the 11 Zero discharge" goal of the Clean Water Act and the 11 Zero risk" 
provision of the Delaney Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
Furthermore, it is ironic to contemplate the numerous industrial-policy 
proposals for funneling federal funds to "worthy 11 private investment areas at 
a time when the federal government is running budget deficits of $200 billion 
a year. The most effective way to increase private capital formation is just 
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the reverse of the RFC approach; it is to reduce the federal drain on private 
saving represented by massive deficit financing. 
Finally, federal lending programs are a classic example of robbing Peter 
to pay-- or lend to-- Paul. They do nothing to increase the pool of private 
saving. But they do reduce the amount available in the private market. 
The most effective strategy for encouraging economic growth is no secret. 
It is to reduce government barriers and achieve a better functioning market 
economy. However, the approach I am advocating is not accompanied by any 
guarantee. In a truly dynamic, competitive economy, we do not know in advance 
where the new product breakthroughs will occur. And the benefits will not be 
evenly distributed. But we do know that society as a whole will be better 
off, since it is likely that most --but not all industrial workers and 
employers will enjoy higher real incomes and living standards. Surely the 
positive types of industrial policy are designed to enhance productivity, 
capital formation, and international competitiveness. The negative approaches 
are all adverse to these key economic goals. 
Conclusion 
The current discussion of industrial policy ignores the fundamental 
contradictions that now abound in government policies affecting private 
industry. The worst thing that we could do, however, is to shift from the 
much maligned, ad hoc approach to a tidier and better planned system of 
business bailouts. Say's Law -- supply creates its own demand -- would work 
with a vengeance. The assured supply of assistance would create more demands 
for aid. Companies would be more reluctant to make those difficult choices 
needed to avoid pleas for government aid. Unions would be reluctant to settle 
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for less if the government ultimately validates pay increases beyond the 
capacity of companies to pay. 
Much of the current talk of a comprehensive industrial policy smacks of 
national economic planning. The rekindled interest in such an approach is due 
to a simpleminded analogy with planning techniques in private business. But 
to talk about 11Corporate planning .. and "government planning" in the same 
breath disregards the fundamental distinction between members of a society 
forecasting and reacting to the future, and the government of that society 
trying to regulate or control it. Corporate planning is necessarily based on 
attempting to persuade consumers to buy a firm's goods or services. In 
striking contrast, the government is sovereign, and its planning ultimately 
involves the use of its power to achieve the results it desires. 
When we look at the operation of centralized economic planning adopted by 
market-oriented, non-Communist nations, we find that these planning systems 
have shifted the focus of private enterprise even further away from dealing 
with market forces and consumer demands, toward reaching an accomodation with 
an ever more powerful government bureaucracy. 
Under an American version of centralized economic planning, a company 
might find it desirable to shift resources from conventional marketing 
activities to convincing the government to adopt more generous production 
targets for its industry. Thus, there might be less payoff from traditional 
consumer market research than from new efforts to persuade the government to 
treat the industry more favorably. Such public sector "marketing" activities 
would be a low priority use of business resources from the viewpoint of 
society as a whole. Yet, given the incentive of any organization to grow and 
prosper in the environment it faces, this result would not be surprising under 
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a system of strong national economic planning and centralized decision 
making. 
A cynic might conclude that the optimum amount of change in industrial 
policy is zero. That is, the positive approaches that I have advocated may 
not be adopted and the negative approaches that involve further government 
intervention may turn out to be more popular. But I remain a patient 
optimist, hoping that some modest contribution to a more productive and 
competitive industrial structure will result from the renewed interest in 
facing the nation•s economic problems. 
